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Given the widespread interest in the development of children’s selective social learning, 
there is mounting evidence suggesting that infants prefer to learn from competent informants 
(Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016). However, little research has been dedicated to 
understanding how this selectivity develops. The present study investigated whether causal 
learning and precursor metacognitive abilities govern discriminant learning in a classic word-
learning paradigm. Infants were exposed to a speaker who accurately (reliable condition) or 
inaccurately (unreliable condition) labeled familiar objects, and were subsequently tested on their 
ability to learn a novel word from the informant. The predictive power of causal learning skills 
and precursor metacognition (as measured through decision confidence) on infants’ word 
learning was examined across both reliable and unreliable conditions. Results suggest that infants 
are more inclined to accept an unreliable speaker’s testimony on a word learning task when they 
also lack confidence in their own knowledge on a task measuring their metacognitive ability. 
Additionally, when uncertain, infants draw on causal learning abilities to better learn the 
association between a label and a novel toy. This study is the first to shed light on the role of 
causal learning and precursor metacognitive judgments in infants’ abilities to engage in selective 
trust. 
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Knowing who knows: Infants’ metacognitive and causal learning abilities guide selective 
social learning 
 
The social world provides us with a wealth of information that we can choose or choose 
not to accept. Children are no exception. In fact, children mainly learn from those around them, a 
phenomenon referred to as social learning. However, social information can be outdated and 
inappropriate. Thus, children must be able to filter among potential informants and keep track of 
those who can offer accurate information in order to successfully learn from those around them. 
A plethora of research has demonstrated that children actively engage in social learning 
strategies that enable them to differentiate between reliable and unreliable sources of 
information, and then display selective trust in one source over another (Koenig & Harris, 2005; 
Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013; Mills, 2013; Nurmsoo, Robinson & Butterfill, 2010). For example, 
children evaluate informants and have been shown to prefer adults over children, but not if an 
adult has previously been inaccurate (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). Additionally, providing trait labels 
(e.g., “very good” or “not very good”) enable 4-year-olds to prefer accurate informants after only 
one trial (Fitneva & Dunfield, 2010). Although research in this area has mainly focused on 
children of preschool age, there is increasing empirical support for selective social learning 
occurring during the infancy period (Harris et al., 2018; Mills, 2013; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-
Liard, 2016 for reviews). To date, a large body of evidence has revealed that infants are sensitive 
to several properties of a social model to guide their learning. For example, it has been shown 
that infants are attuned to informants’ accuracy (e.g., Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013), age (e.g., 
Ryalls, Gul, & Ryalls, 2000), and confidence (e.g., Brosseau-Liard & Poulin-Dubois, 2014) to 
help them decide from whom to learn. 
Despite growing empirical support for children’s selectivity in social learning, there is 
surprisingly little research dedicated to understanding how this selectivity develops (Heyes, 
2016). There is considerable theoretical disagreement among researchers over the mechanisms 
underlying selective social learning in early childhood and infancy. Consistent with a rich 
account of early selective trust, researchers argue that social learning in young children is 
governed by domain-specific, higher-order, cognitive abilities (Harris & Koenig, 2006; Poulin-
Dubois, 2017; Sabbagh, Koenig, & Kulmeier, 2017). In contrast, a lean perspective holds the 
view that young children rely on domain-general, lower-order, cognitive functions (Heyes, 
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2016). According to the latter account, the abilities that underlie selective social learning in 
infancy are unsophisticated and shared with non-human animals, namely associative processes.  
Social learning in non-human animals 
There is a large body of work demonstrating that social learning is prevalent in the 
animal kingdom. Animals from various species—such as fruit flies, birds, rodents, fish and 
primates—have been shown to use social learning strategies to acquire biological information 
simply from observing others (Heyes, 2012). Social learning provides animals with information 
about habitat, diet, predators, mating, as well as collective behavior (see Galef & Heyes, 2004 
and Hoppitt & Laland, 2008 for reviews). These strategies also specify situations when it might 
be adaptive to copy others (Heyes, 2016). In fact, experimental studies have revealed functional 
parallels in social learning across human and non-human animals (Rendell et al., 2011 for a 
review). Like humans, sticklebacks—a fresh water fish species—have been shown to copy others 
when uncertain, and when asocial learning is risky (van Bergen, Coolen, & Laland, 2004). 
Interestingly, there is also evidence indicating that other stickleback and guppy species are 
sensitive to social cues such as age (Dugatkin & Godin, 1993), size (Duffy, Pike, & Laland, 
2009), boldness (Godin & Dugatkin, 1996), and familiarity (Swaney, Kendal, Capon, Brown & 
Laland, 2001). Studies with rats also provide empirical support for the use of social learning 
strategies such as copying others who are more successful, and when environments are relatively 
stable—as opposed to environments that are unpredictable and susceptible to rapid change 
(Galef, 2009). Moreover, research with chimpanzees shows a preference to copy individuals of 
higher rank and prestige (Horner, Proctor, Bonnie, Whiten, & de Waal, 2010). Together, these 
studies show us that even animals have the capacity to engage in learning by observing others of 
its species. Specifically, it appears that animals use state-based (e.g., copy when uncertain, when 
asocial learning is risky, etc.) and model-based (e.g., dominance rank based, prestige-based) 
social learning strategies to acquire important information for their survival (Rendell et al., 
2011). 
Domain-general account of selective social learning 
Some attention has been given to the psychological mechanisms mediating the selectivity 
of this behavior in non-human animals. The mechanisms proposed are domain-general processes 
based on principles of associative learning—those that are driven by the learned predictiveness 
of a stimulus. Broadly, the productiveness of a stimulus refers to the accuracy of predicting 
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action-outcome relationships (Le Pelley, Vadillo & Luque, 2013). Research indicates that 
learning of action-outcome relationships occurs more readily when the stimulus is predictive 
(i.e., when the stimulus consistently elicits the same outcome), as opposed to when the stimulus 
is non-predictive (Le Pelley et al., 2013). This finding suggests that learned predictiveness 
modulates attention. That is, more attention is directed to predictive stimuli relative to non-
predictive stimuli, which therefore increases the rate by which an association is learned (Le 
Pelley et al., 2013). The ability to learn about relationships and predict future behavior is also 
thought to be based on causal theories of learning (Sawa, 2009). Causal learning refers to the 
ability of inferring causal relations from patterns of observed events and their respective 
outcomes (Gopnik et al., 2004). Specifically, we form internal causal models by observing 
sequences external events that are temporally contingent (Sawa, 2009). For example, people 
often infer causality when they observe that flipping a switch is followed by a light that is turned 
on (Sawa, 2009).  
It has been suggested that similar, basic mechanisms operate in human social learning— 
particularly early in life. Heyes (2016) suggests that evidence of early selective social learning is 
often interpreted in a way that implies that children’s behavior is guided by conscious efforts to 
apply learning strategies (e.g., copy if uncertain, copy the majority, etc.). However, it is argued 
that children appear to discriminately learn from others, but that the selectivity of their learning 
may not be known to the children themselves (Heyes, 2016). In other words, children do not 
apply social learning strategies deliberately—instead, their learning may be driven by associative 
and causal learning processes. To illustrate, in a study by Brooker and Poulin-Dubois (2013), 
infants demonstrated a preference to learn a new word from a reliable informant (i.e., who 
previously labelled familiar objects correctly) relative to an unreliable informant (i.e., who 
previously labelled familiar objects incorrectly). From an associative perspective, infants were 
less likely to learn from an unreliable informant because the association between the label and 
the familiar object was not predictive. In other words, the unreliable informant provided a label 
that did not accurately predict the object that was presented. As a result, this led the infants to 
attend less and learn less from the speaker. In line with a lean interpretation of selective social 
learning, more sophisticated abilities (e.g., metacognition— the ability of reflecting on one’s 
own mental states; Flavell, 1979) are proposed to come online in late childhood and play a larger 
role in adulthood due to social experience (Heyes, 2016). 
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Domain-specific account of selective social learning  
Alternatively, other researchers maintain that individual differences in precursor domain-
specific abilities may explain early selective social learning (Harris & Koenig, 2006; Poulin-
Dubois, 2017). In particular, theory-of-mind, or the ability to make rational inferences about 
others’ mental states (e.g., knowledge) has been proposed to account for this link. Evidence in 
preschoolers suggests that children are capable of attributing knowledge or ignorance based on 
the accuracy or inaccuracy of an informant’s behavior. These mental state inferences are thought 
to guide children’s decisions about whether to endorse one informant relative to another 
(Brosseau-Liard, Penney, & Poulin-Dubois, 2015; Harris & Koenig, 2006; Sobel & Kushnir, 
2013). Therefore, it is proposed that children who demonstrate a stronger understanding of 
others’ mental states would also be more successful selective social learners (Brosseau-Liard et 
al., 2015; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). This link has been demonstrated in children of pre-school and 
school age (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2015; DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; DiYanni, Nini, Rheel, 
Livelli, 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 2008; Lucas, Lewis, Pala, Wong, & Berridge, 2013; Elashi & 
Mills, 2014). However, other studies have yielded inconsistent results, in that young children’s 
theory-of-mind abilities have no bearing on the selectivity of their learning (e.g., Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig & Harris, 2007). As such, additional research is required to further elucidate 
the relation between these abilities.  
Selective trust & Theory-of-Mind 
To our knowledge, there are only two studies that sought to examine such link in 
infancy—that is, to investigate whether domain-specific (i.e., theory-of-mind) or domain-general 
(i.e., associative learning and statistical learning—the ability of detecting statistical regularities 
in the environment) abilities govern selective social learning in infants. Crivello, Phillips, and 
Poulin-Dubois (2017) reported that 18-month-old infants who were able to correctly make 
inferences about the knowledge state of others were less likely to accept an unreliable 
informant’s testimony. More specifically, infants who correctly inferred the knowledge state of 
an experimenter, also demonstrated decreased willingness to learn a novel word from an 
informant who had previously displayed incompetence (Crivello et al., 2017). Interestingly, no 
association was observed with statistical learning abilities, suggesting that infants’ abilities to 
extract statistical regularities from their environment was not associated with their selective word 
learning abilities. In a recent follow-up study, Crivello and Poulin-Dubois (2018) examined the 
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extent to which knowledge inference and associative learning abilities guide 14-month-old 
infants’ detection of emotionally incongruent expressions (i.e., display of happiness while 
looking at an empty container). Consistent with previous results, infants who demonstrated 
stronger abilities to make inferences about others’ knowledge states were better able to detect the 
unreliability of an emoter. Again, no link with associative learning was revealed. Together, these 
studies provide preliminary evidence for a domain-specific account of selective social learning in 
infancy. 
Metacognition as a possible mechanism  
Theory-of-mind abilities are often linked to metacognition. In fact, many would argue 
that that the two abilities are synonymous, such that both concepts refer to knowledge of mental 
states (Flavell, 2000). Despite this obvious similarity, research streams and the operational 
definition of these constructs differ (Ebert, 2015). Research on theory-of-mind is focused on 
children’s understanding of other’s mental states and the influence on their behavior (Flavell, 
2000). Whereas, research on metacognition is targeted at examining how metacognitive ability 
impacts learning and school performance (Flavell, 2000). Here, we refer to theory-of-mind 
abilities as an understanding of other’s mental states, such as beliefs, intentions, as well as 
desires (Wellman, 2014), and refer to metacognition as the ability to reflect on one’s own mental 
states—particularly, one’s thinking and learning (Flavell, 1979; Guerten & Willems, 2016).  
That said, metacognitive abilities have also been proposed to govern selective social 
learning (Heyes, 2016). Heyes (2016) argues that explicit metacognitive social learning 
strategies permit cumulative cultural change in humans—that is, the creation of social traditions 
and the transmission of wisdom across generations. Explicit metacognition represents abilities 
that are conscious in form, and precipitate a slow and serial approach to problems (Heyes, 2016). 
It is functionally dependent on working memory, given that individuals must reflect on both 
current and previous knowledge to guide future learning (Heyes, 2016). Importantly, an explicit 
understanding of one’s own mental states requires the ability to verbally generate explanations 
about the mental processes guiding our behavior (Frith, 2011). By contrast, implicit 
metacognition approaches problems rapidly and in parallel, and are also less dependent on 
working memory ability (Heyes, 2016). An implicit understanding refers to a process of 
reflecting on mental states without providing verbal justifications (Frith, 2011).  
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Explicit metacognition enables successful learning, such that individuals adjust their 
learning strategies based on their state of knowledge within a given context. Specifically, it is 
argued that explicit metacognition enables humans to ask themselves “who knows” when 
deciding from whom to learn (Heyes, 2016). Humans apply social learning strategies in more 
sophisticated ways that reflects their possible metacognitive content, and direct their learning to 
better sources of information. For instance, the “copy the majority” social rule becomes “copy 
the majority when the majority is likely to know best” (Heyes, 2016). A body of work with 
adults demonstrates that learning strategies that specify when and from whom to learn can be 
metacognitive in nature. For example, adults are more likely to use social information to respond 
to ambiguous perceptual and foraging tasks when their explicit confidence judgments were lower 
(Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012). 
Moreover, extant research supports that explicit metacognitive ability is predictive of 
successful social learning strategies even in school-age children (e.g., Dunlosky & Rawson, 
2012; Sodian & Frith, 2008). Despite their strong propensity to learn, young children under the 
age of four years have been shown to make inaccurate metacognitive judgments (e.g., Flavell, 
1999; Sodian, Thoermer, Kristen, & Perst, 2012). However, researchers suggest that young 
children’s explicit metacognitive abilities are underestimated in these studies given that the 
measures rely heavily on verbal ability. When non-verbal measures are considered across various 
experimental modalities (i.e., behavioral, neural and pupil dilation), it appears that these abilities 
may emerge earlier than expected (Goupil & Kouider, 2016; Goupil, Romand-Monnier, Kouider, 
2016; Paulus, Proust & Sodian, 2013). For example, it has been shown that similar 
electrophysiological signatures of error monitoring are elicited in adults and infants following an 
incorrect decision (Goupil et al., 2016). In addition, pupillometric analysis in preschoolers 
reveals evidence for implicit metacognitive memory monitoring (Paulus et al., 2013). Behavioral 
forms of metacognition are assessed using decision confidence monitoring and information-
seeking paradigms. These paradigms involve observing infants’ behavior under conditions in 
which an infant—or even an animal (e.g., Hampton, 2009)—would be uncertain following an 
event that is difficult to remember. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that a wide range of 
animals, including bird species, monitor their own knowledge states and engage in information-
seeking when ignorant (e.g., Call & Carpenter, 2001; Beran & Smith, 2011; Rosati & Santos, 
2016; Watanabe & Clayton, 2016). 
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In infancy, when nonverbal forms of metacognition are assessed, it appears that 20- 
month-old infants are capable of monitoring their uncertainty and non-verbally express their 
uncertainty to others (Goupil, Romand-Monnier, Kouider, 2016). Additionally, there is evidence 
to suggest that 18-month-old infants monitor the accuracy of their decisions (Goupil & Kouider, 
2016). More specifically, infants display increased post-decision persistence for correct choices 
as compared to incorrect choices when identifying the location of a toy following a delay of 
several seconds (Goupil & Kouider, 2016).  
Taken together, explicit metacognitive strategies that enable reflecting on one’s 
knowledge may be important for us to selectively learn from others. While it was previously 
believed that these abilities emerge at the preschool age when children begin to talk about their 
mental states (Guerten & Willems, 2016), there is some evidence showing that primitive forms 
of these abilities are manifested in infancy. Specifically, when demands of verbal abilities are 
removed, it appears that even infants are able to engage in metacognitive monitoring to guide 
their future behavior (Goupil & Kouider, 2016). As such, it may be the case that infants use 
precursor metacognitive judgments to direct their social learning to reliable sources of 
information. 
The present study 
The main objective of the present research is to explore the mechanisms at the origins of 
selective social learning by examining whether causal learning and precursor metacognitive 
abilities can account for 18-month-old infants’ ability to avoid learning from incompetent 
informants. Infants were presented with a speaker who either accurately or inaccurately labeled a 
familiar object. Following this event, infants’ willingness to learn a novel word from the speaker 
was examined. Based on prior findings using the word-learning paradigm, it was expected that 
infants would be less likely to learn a novel word from an unreliable speaker relative to a reliable 
one (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013; Crivello et al., 2017; Luchkina, Sobel & Morgan, 2018; 
Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004).  
Consistent with extant research on the mechanisms of early selective trust (Crivello et al., 
2017; Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2018), it is hypothesized that selective social learning in 
infancy is governed by domain-specific abilities (i.e., metacognition). More specifically, infants 
with better awareness of their confidence—as measured through a decision confidence 
paradigm—will be less likely to display selective trust in an unreliable source. That is, infants 
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who display decreased persistence times on incorrect trials, and longer persistence times on 
correct trials on the metacognition task will be less willing to learn a novel word from an 
unreliable speaker. Subsequently, performance on a causal learning task is not hypothesized to 
predict infants’ selective word-learning. This prediction is based on previous studies that have 
not reported a link between domain-general skills (i.e., associative and statistical learning) and 
selective trust abilities. Finally, infants’ performance on both the metacognition and on the 
causal learning task is not expected to predict word-learning from a reliable informant, given that 



























Participants lived in a large metropolitan Canadian city and were recruited from a 
governmental health agency. A total of 92 infants, aged 18 months, were tested. Selection criteria 
required that children did not have auditory or visual impairments, or any birth complications. 
Importantly, inclusion criteria required that infants be exposed to English or French. Given that 
the word-learning task served as the basis for the study, the following exclusions are specific to 
the word-learning task. An additional 28 infants were excluded as a result of fussiness (n = 10), 
having a dominant language that was not English or French (n = 12), providing ambiguous 
responses such as offering both toys or none (n = 4), parental interference (n = 1), and 
experimenter error (n = 1). Thus, the overall sample consisted of 64 infants (Mage = 18.20 
months, SD = .99, range = 16 – 20.30 months; 31 males, 33 females). 
Procedure 
MacArthur-Based Short Form Vocabulary Checklist: Level II (MCDI-II). 
American-English and French-Canadian adaptations of the MCDI were administered to assess 
infants’ total productive vocabulary (Fenson et al., 2000; Trudeau, Frank & Poulin-Dubois, 
1999). The MCDI-II, developed for children between the ages of 16 and 30 months, is comprised 
of 100 vocabulary items that include nouns, verbs, and adjectives. The child’s primary caregiver 
completed the form. 
  Word Comprehension checklist. French and English versions of a 20-word checklist 
were administered to obtain a brief estimate of children’s receptive vocabulary, and to select 
words for the word-learning task (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013). The form consisted of nouns 
that would be familiar to children of this age, and was used to select stimuli in the selective 
social learning task. 
Selective word-learning task. In a procedure identical to that of Brooker and Poulin-
Dubois (2013), and Crivello and colleagues (2016), infants were presented with labels for 
familiar and novel stimuli.  
Reliability exposure phase. Through random assignment, participants were allocated to a 
reliable (n = 33) or unreliable (n = 31) condition. A total of four small plastic toys were selected 
based on the words endorsed by the child’s caregiver on the 20-word checklist described above, 
and were either labelled correctly (reliable) or incorrectly (unreliable). Participants were required 
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to be familiar with a minimum of three of the four words in order to be included for analysis 
(Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013; Crivello et al., 2017). A total of 53 infants were familiar with 
all four words, and a total of 11 infants were familiar with three of the four words. First, children 
were given 15 seconds to explore each of the toys. Following this, the experimenter labeled each 
object with the same label three times. For example, while manipulating the object, the reliable 
experimenter pointed to the toy and said “That’s a shoe. See, it’s a shoe. Look at the shoe”. The 
child was given the toy again to play with (15 s) immediately after it was labelled by the 
experimenter. 
Word-Learning phase. The word-learning phase assessed children’s willingness to learn 
from the informant given the accuracy with which she previously labelled familiar objects 
(reliability phase). This was comprised of three sub-phases: warm-up, training, and test phase. 
First, the experimenter presented the child with two familiar toys (different from those in the 
reliability phase) on a tray, and requested one from the child. The purpose of this trial was to 
ensure that the child understood the task (Brooker & Poulin-Dubois, 2013). In the training phase, 
the experimenter introduced two novel toys, and modeled how to play with each of the toys. For 
example, a rattle-type plastic toy was shaken, and a wooden toy that looked like a spinner-top 
was spun. Children were then given 15 s to explore both toys. Following this, the experimenter 
retrieved one of the toys from the child, and labelled it by saying “It’s a Dax”. The experimenter 
provided this label a total of four times. The test phase consisted of two trial types: familiar and 
novel trials, wherein a pair of familiar and novel toys were introduced, respectively. The familiar 
toys were different from those shown in previous trials, and the novel toys were the same as 
those described above. The same pair of novel toys was presented to the child across all novel 
trials. A total of 8 trials were administered—four familiar and four novel trials, alternating in 
order. On each of the trials, the experimenter requested one of the two objects (i.e., “Where is the 
X? Give me the X.”). Importantly, on the novel trials, the experimenter only requested the novel 
toy she had previously labeled as the “Dax”. If the child offered two toys simultaneously, then 
the trial was repeated. The type of trial (i.e., familiar vs. novel) was counterbalanced in order. 
The type of novel toy and the location of the toys on the tray were also counterbalanced. The 
number of correct responses on test trials were coded for a maximum score of 4 across trial type. 
Causal Learning task. An adaptation of the blicket task was administered to obtain an 
index of infants’ causal learning abilities (Sobel & Kirkham, 2006). A blicket detector was 
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used—identical to that described by Sobel and Kirkham (2006)—which was made of wood 
(painted grey) and a red Lucite top. The box was developed so that it can be plugged into an 
electrical outlet with a switchbox attached. This allowed the experimenter to control the detector 
out of the child’s view. The detector became immediately activated when an object was placed 
on the red top and was deactivated when the object was removed. When activated, the detector lit 
up and played a song (Für Elise). A total of nine blocks—different in shape and color—were 
used as stimuli for the imitation and test trials. The detector and the blocks rested on a tray 
throughout the administration. 
First, the child played with the experimenter with a set of blocks (different from those 
used in the imitation and test trials) for three minutes. Following the familiarization phase, the 
child and caregiver sat on one side of a child-size table. The caregiver sat behind the child, and 
held the child upright in front of him or her. The experimenter sat on the opposite side of the 
table with the blicket detector on a tray. The imitation trial required that the experimenter place 
two blocks on opposite ends of the tray, and then place each block separately on the detector. 
Importantly, only one of the blocks activated the detector. This was demonstrated twice. The 
experimenter provided verbal cues when one block activated the detector, and when the other did 
not by saying “Wow” or “No”, respectively. The experimenter then encouraged the child to 
activate the detector by sliding the tray over, and saying “It’s your turn. Make it go.” 
Importantly, the child was only given one opportunity to make a response before the 
experimenter slid the tray out of the child’s reach. 
A total of three experimental trials were administered. The location of the blocks on the 
tray for each trial was counterbalanced. On the first trial, two different blocks were successively 
placed on the tray (A and B). Block A activated the detector, whereas Block B did not. Then, 
both blocks were placed on the detector, and it was activated. This demonstration was 
administered twice. Following this, the experimenter slid the tray over to the child and said “It’s 
your turn. Make it go.” On the next trial, another pair of blocks was placed on the tray. Both 
blocks were placed on the detector twice, activating the machine. Then, one of the two blocks 
(Block B) was placed on the detector, and the machine did not activate. The experimenter then 
slid the tray over to the child, and said “It’s your turn. Make it go.” 
Finally, a series of three different blocks were placed on the tray. Two blocks (A and B) 
were placed on either end of the tray, and the third (C) was placed in the middle. Blocks A and C 
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were placed on the detector together twice, which activated the detector both times. 
Subsequently, only Block C was placed on the detector, and the machine activated. Block C was 
then removed, and the tray was slid over to the child while the experimenter said “It’s your turn. 
Make it go.” The proportion of correct test trials (out of 3) was calculated. 
Metacognition task. Adapted from the task designed by Goupil & Kouider (2016), an 
interactive metacognitive task was used to measure infants’ ability to monitor decision 
confidence. Infants were exposed to two identical black boxes (15.5 x 25.5 x 30.5 cm) that were 
made from white Styrofoam. The front of each of the boxes had an opening (9.5 x 15.5 cm) 
covered in green spandex with a horizontal slit. The green covering was layered on top of a black 
piece of spandex with a vertical slit. The boxes were designed so that children were able to reach 
inside the boxes, but unable to see its contents. Inside each of the boxes was a small pocket that 
was created by cutting and removing a piece of Styrofoam. The stimuli used for the warm-up and 
familiarization trials were small plastic toys—two of which measured 7 cm by 4 cm and the 
other two measured 3.5 cm by 5 cm. The test stimuli consisted of four colorful (blue, orange, 
yellow and green) rectangular wooden blocks (3.5 x 5 cm). The stimuli were randomly selected 
for each trial. Finally, a small puppet theatre was used (80.5 x 34 cm) with two black curtains 
hanging from it. 
  First, the experimenter introduced each of the boxes by saying “Look [child’s name]! The 
nice box! I put my hand inside! You try!” The experimenter then pushed the box towards the 
child so that it was within his/her reach, encouraging the child to put his/her hand inside the box. 
A total of two warm-up trials were administered, wherein a toy was hidden in one of the two 
boxes and infants were asked to retrieve the toy. Before hiding the toy, the experimenter 
presented it to the child by centering it on the table and saying “Look [child’s name’]! A toy! I 
hide it in the box!” After the child watched the experimenter place the toy in the box, it was 
pushed forward so that the child can retrieve the toy. 
Two familiarization trials were then administered. Similar to the warm-up trials, the 
familiarization trials followed an identical procedure as outlined above. However, the 
familiarization trials required both boxes to be pushed toward the child so that he/she was 
required to select the box that he/she thought the toy was hidden. As the experimenter pushed the 
boxes forward, she said, “Where is the toy? Can you show me?” The experimenter waited until 
the child pointed to one of the boxes—indicating that the child selected the box that he/she 
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would like to search—and then moved the box forward. Correct responses were praised (“Yes, it 
is here. Look!”), whereas incorrect responses were corrected (“No, it is there. Look!”). If the 
child selected the incorrect box, he or she was given the opportunity to search the correct box for 
the toy. 
A total of eight experimental trials were then administered. The procedure was identical 
to that of the familiarization trials, except that the experimental trials incurred a delay (6 or 9 
seconds randomized in order), and both boxes were hidden from the child’s view by a curtain. 
Importantly, the toy was now secretly hidden in a pocket inside the box, rendering the toy 
impossible for the child to find. Post-decision persistence time was measured by coding the 
amount of time the child searched the box. 
Design 
Prior to the testing session, infants were exposed to a warm-up phase in order to become 
accustomed to the environment and the experimenters. During this period, the caregiver was 
asked to complete the MCDI-II and the Word comprehension checklist to guide the selection of 
stimuli for the selective word-learning task. Infants were randomly assigned to either the reliable 
or unreliable condition, and the administration of the word-learning task followed. 
Counterbalanced in order, the subsequent two tasks (causal learning and metacognition tasks) 
were then administered. The word-learning task was always administered first given that 
performance on this task was critical for our main analysis, and thus made it important to 
circumvent any fatigue effect. Of note, the experimenter who administered the word-learning 
task did not administer either of the subsequent tasks in order to avoid possible carry-over effects 
due to the reliability exposure phase. As such, two experimenters were required. Parents were 





A series of comparative analyses were conducted across reliable and unreliable 
conditions of the selective word-learning task to ensure that the groups were equivalent in age, 
gender, and vocabulary knowledge. Analyses revealed no significant differences in age t (64) = 
.25, p = .80, d = .04, or gender, χ2 = .06, p = .81. Moreover, analyses did not yield significant 
differences in the proportion of known words on the receptive vocabulary checklist, t (64) = .92, 
p = .36, d = .04 (Reliable: M = .63, SD = .25; Unreliable: M = .68, SD = .22) or on the index of 
expressive vocabulary, t (64) = -25, p = .81, d = .07 (Reliable: M = .15, SD = .13; Unreliable: M 
= .16, SD = .16). Finally, participants did not differ on the proportion of words they were 
familiar with on the 20-word checklist used for the reliability phase of the word-learning task, t 
(64) = -.14, p = .89 (Reliable: M = .94, SD = .02; Unreliable: M = .94, SD = .02). 
Selective Word-Learning task. 
To examine possible fatigue effects, a one-way analysis of variance was conducted across 
8 trials, irrespective of condition and trial type, with correct choice as the dependent variable. 
The analysis revealed a significant decrease in the number of correct offers across trials,  
F (1, 452) = 13.23, p < .001, η2 = .39. As follow up, two binary logistic regression models were 
conducted to assess whether correct responses on the task varied as a function of block (first four 
vs. last four trials) and trial type (familiar vs. novel trials) across unreliable and reliable 
conditions. Both predictors were entered into the models simultaneously. The model conducted 
for the unreliable condition yielded significant findings, χ2 (2) = 9.10, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.055. Trial type significantly predicted correct offers of the target object irrespective of block (b 
= .77), such that infants were 2.2 times more likely to offer the target object across familiar trials 
relative to novel trials. Moreover, the model conducted for the reliable condition also yielded 
significance, χ2 (2) = 6.01, p = .05, Nagelkerke R2 =.035. Trial type did not emerge as a 
significant predictor. Instead, block of trials significantly predicted correct responses, 
irrespective of trial type (b = .59). Infants in the reliable condition were 1.8 times more likely to 
offer the target object in Block 1 relative to Block 2. Given these results, subsequent analyses for 
the selective word-learning task only included the first four trials—consisting a total of two 
novel and two familiar trials—to minimize statistical error in the data. 
A mixed analysis of variance was conducted in order to examine differences in 
performance across both conditions on familiar and novel trials. The proportion of correct 
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responses was entered as the dependent variable. A significant main effect of trial type emerged, 
wherein infants’ performance on familiar trials (M = .71, SD = .38) was superior as compared to 
performance on novel trials (M = .56, SD = .33), F (1,62) = 4.80, p = .03, η2 = .07. Additionally, 
a significant main effect of condition was observed, in that infants in the reliable condition 
correctly offered the target object more frequently irrespective of trial type (M = .72, SD = .33), 
relative to the unreliable condition (M = .56, SD = .33), F (1,62) = 7.46, p =.01, η2 = .107). 
Moreover, a Condition x Trial type interaction emerged as a trend, F (1,62) = 3.44, p = .07, η2 = 
.05. Consistent with our hypotheses, planned comparisons revealed that infants in the reliable 
condition presented with a larger proportion of correct offers on novel trials (M = .71, SD = .37) 
relative to infants in the unreliable condition (M = .42, SD = .38), F (1,62) = 7.93, p = .01, η2 = 
.11). Also in line with our predictions, differences between reliable and unreliable conditions 
across familiar trials were not observed, F (1, 62) = .06, p = .81, η2 = .001 (see Figure 1). 
Proportion of correct offers across familiar and novel trials were subsequently examined against 
chance responding (.50). On familiar trials, infants in both the reliable (M = .73, SD = .36), t (32) 
= .37, p = .001, and unreliable condition (M = .69, SD = .40), t (30) = 2.68, p = .01, performed 
above chance. On novel trials, infants in the reliable condition performed above chance (M = .71, 
SD = .35), t (32) = 3.35, p = .002, whereas infants in the unreliable condition did not differ from 
chance level (M = .42, SD = .32), t (30) = -1.41, p = .17. Of note, similar pattern of results were 






Figure 1. Performance on the selective word-learning task across unreliable and reliable 
conditions. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. * significantly different 
performance in unreliable and reliable groups on novel trials. t trend difference between novel 
and familiar trials in unreliable group. 
 
Correlates of Selective Social Learning. 
Children’s performance on correlate tasks were first examined independently, regardless 
if they were included on the selective word-learning task. This was in order to evaluate 
children’s performance relative to performance reported in the original studies. 
Causal Learning task. 
Performance on the Blicket task was examined relative to a chance criterion (.50) to 
reflect two possible response options across trials (i.e., Block A or B). Akin to Sobel and 
Kirkham (2006), only infants who passed the imitation trial were included in the analysis. Of the 
92 participants who were tested, non-parametric analyses were conducted among a sample of 56 
infants. A total of 36 participants were excluded—specifically, because failure of the imitation 
trial (n = 18), fussiness (n = 11) or technical difficulties (n = 7). Results revealed that 
performance on both the “screening-off trial” and the “indirect screening-off trial” did not yield 
differences from chance, such that 42% (p = .40) and 56% (p = .50) of infants placed the correct 
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block on the detector, respectively. Similarly, performance on the backward blocking trial was at 
chance level (64%; p = .16). Consistent with the original study, chance responding was 
compared to the frequency with which infants placed block A on the detector given the 
ambiguity of the correct response. That is, children were required to select between Block A and 
a block whose causal efficacy was unknown. 
Moreover, given that trials were presented in a fixed order, subsequent analyses were 
conducted in order to test for order effects. Results indicated that performance on the “screening-
off trial” influenced performance on the “indirect screening off trial”, χ2 (1, N = 56) = 36.64, p = 
.002, and “backward blocking trial”, χ2 (1, N = 56) = 36.64, p = .002. Additionally, the impact of 
performance on the “indirect screening trial” on performance on the “backward blocking trial” 
emerged as a trend, χ2 (1, N = 56) = 12.98, p = .07. Together, results suggest that performance on 
later trials was influenced by performance on trials that were previously administered.  
Metacognition task. 
Analysis for the metacognition task was conducted among a sample of 61 infants. A total 
of 31 participants were excluded—specifically, due to fussiness (n = 17), non-responsiveness 
across trials (n = 6), not having completed a sufficient number of trials (n = 5), side preference (n 
= 2) and experimenter error (n = 1). 
A one-way analysis of variance was first conducted to examine possible fatigue effects 
across the 8 trials, irrespective of delay (i.e., 6 or 9 seconds). The dependent variable was 
infants’ accuracy in identifying the box where the toy is hidden. Results indicated a significant 
decrease in accuracy across trials, F (1, 420) = 11.43, p = .001, η2 = .31. A binary logistic 
regression was subsequently conducted to assess whether accuracy on the metacognition task 
varied across block (first four vs. last four trials) and memorization delay (6 vs. 9 seconds). The 
model yielded significant findings, χ2 (2) = 8.80, p = .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .03. Block of trials 
emerged as a significant predictor of accuracy (b = .60), whereas memorization delay did not (b 
= -.01). Results suggest that infants were 1.8 times more likely to respond correctly across trials 
in Block 1 relative to trials in Block 2, and were equally likely to accurately identify where the 
toy was hidden across trials with 6- and 9-second delays. Given these findings, subsequent 
analyses for this task included the first four trials in an effort to reduce the amount of statistical 
error in the data. Infants’ performance was next examined against chance responding (.05), and 
demonstrated that accuracy was above chance, t (60) = 5.42, p < .001 (M = .62, SD = .18). 
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Following this, a paired-samples comparison was conducted to evaluate differences in 
persistence time—as measured in seconds—across correct and incorrect trials. Infants were not 
included in this analysis if they achieved perfect accuracy across all four trials. Of note, data 
screening revealed that persistence time data were not normally distributed and were thus log 
transformed. Results from paired-samples comparisons with log transformed values and original 
data were compared, and were found to yield similar findings. Thus, non-transformed data are 
reported in an effort to preserve the original metric and facilitate the interpretation of results. 
Descriptive statistics of non-transformed data indicated that, on average, infants correctly 
identified the location of the toy across 2.31 trials (SD = .73) and incorrectly identified the 
location of the toy across 1.60 trials (SD = .69). Consistent with our predictions and in line with 
those of the original experiment (Goupil et al., 2016), infants demonstrate increased persistence 
on correct trials (M = 2.87, SD = 1.21) relative to incorrect trials (M = 2.07, SD = 1.01), t (53) = 
5.72, p = .001, d = .72. Moreover, a positive correlation emerged between persistence time on 
correct and incorrect trials, r (60) = .470, p = .002. 
In addition to infants’ accuracy and persistence time, two subsequent behaviors were 
analysed across both correct and incorrect trials, namely frequency to look inside the box 
selected and frequency to touch the other box. A sample of 27 infants demonstrated at least one 
of these behaviors across the four test trials. First, paired samples comparisons were conducted to 
examine differences in the frequency of each of these behaviors across correct and incorrect test 
trials. Results revealed that infants looked inside the selected box on correct trials more 
frequently (M= 1.00, SD = 1.77) relative to incorrect trials (M = .07, SD = .27), t (26) = 4.22, p < 
.001, d =. 73. In contrast, infants equally touched the other box on correct trials (M = .67, SD = 
1.07) as compared to incorrect trials (M = .78, SD = .75), t (26) = -.49, p = .63, d = .12.  
Cross-task relations among Word-Learning and Correlate tasks 
Inclusion criteria required that infants completed all three tasks—that is, the word-
learning, causal learning and metacognition tasks—in order to be included in regression 
analyses. For the causal learning task, infants were included for analysis irrespective of whether 
they passed (n = 37) or failed  (n = 8) the imitation trial to maximize sample size. The final 
sample consisted of 41 infants (Unreliable: n = 21: Reliable: n = 20). 
Zero-order correlations were conducted in order to examine the associations between 
performance on novel trials of the learning task and performance on the correlate tasks in the 
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reliable and unreliable conditions independently. Bootstrapping procedures were followed given 
that they are recommended practice when data violate normality assumptions, and for analyses 
with small sample sizes (Dwivedi, Mallawaarachchi, Alvarado, 2017). This non-parametric 
procedure is used to empirically generate the distribution of the test statistic in order to yield 
more accurate estimates of the population parameters of interest and the respective confidence 
intervals (Dwivedi et al., 2017). The test of statistical significance is dependent on whether the 
95% confidence interval spans zero. 
Analyses yielded no significant correlations among the selective social learning task and 
correlate tasks in the reliable condition. A positive association was obtained between infants’ 
scores on the causal learning task and performance on novel trials of the selective social learning 
task in the unreliable condition, r (20) = .52, p = .02, 95% CI [.109, .776]. Moreover, a negative 
relation emerged between persistence time on incorrect trials of the metacognition task and 
performance on novel trials in the unreliable condition, r (20) = -.43, p = .05, 95% CI [-.737, -
.007]. In both instances confidence intervals did not span zero, suggesting that those who 
demonstrated superior performance on the causal learning task were also more willing to learn a 
new word from an unreliable speaker. Results also indicate that infants who displayed less 
persistence across incorrect trials of the metacognition task, were more willing to learn a novel 




Table 1. Zero-Order correlations among Selective Word-Learning task and Correlate tasks in 
the unreliable condition  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Causal learning task - .14 
 
p = .56 
-.12 
 
p = .60 
.005 
 





p = .02 




p = .06 
.10 
 
p = .67 
-.01 
 
p = .97 









p = .05 
4. Accuracy on MC task 
   
- .13 
 
p = .59 
5. SWL task (novel trials) 
    
- 
Note. Bootstrapping procedures were used to derive more accurate estimates of zero-
order correlation coefficients; PT = Persistence time; MC = Metacognition task; SWL = 
Selective Word-Learning. * refers to significance at p < .05 level; ** refers to 














Table 2. Zero-Order correlations among Selective Word-Learning task and Correlate tasks in 
the reliable condition  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Causal learning task - .17 
 
p = .48 
-.11 
 
p = .64 
.09 
 
p = .71 
.15 
 
p = .53 






p = .02 
.28 
 
p = .24 
.09 
 
p = .70 




p = .66 
-.18 
 
p = .45 
4. Accuracy on MC task 





p = .002 
5. SWL task (novel trials) 
    
- 
Note. Bootstrapping procedures were used to derive more accurate estimates of zero-
order correlation coefficients; PT = Persistence time; MC = Metacognition task; SWL = 
Selective Word-Learning. * refers to significance at p < .05 level; ** refers to 














Regression models predicting performance on novel trials of Word-Learning task 
A series of hierarchical regression models were conducted in order to derive estimates of 
the predictive power of each of the correlate tasks (i.e., causal learning and metacognitive 
ability) on performance on novel trials of the selective word-learning task across both reliable 
and unreliable conditions. Given that zero-order correlations among performance on novels trials 
of the word-learning task and post-decision persistence on correct trials of the metacognition task 
did not yield significance, infants’ persistence on incorrect trials were only included in regression 
models. To examine the predictive power of metacognitive ability above and beyond that of 
causal learning, performance on the causal learning task was entered first, followed by 
persistence time on incorrect trials of the metacognitive task. Performance on novel trials (i.e., 
proportion of correct offers) was included as the criterion. Importantly, robust regression 
parameters were estimated using bootstrapping procedures described by (Dwivedi et al., 2017). 
Model 1: Predicting performance on novel trials in the unreliable condition. In step 
1, causal learning predicted scores, and accounted for approximately 27% of the variance on 
novel trials, F (1, 19) = 6.99, p = .016, R2 = .27. When metacognitive ability was entered into the 
model, both predictors of interest significantly predicted scores on novel trials, Δ F (2, 18) = 
6.23, p = .009. R2 = .41. The change in R2 value indicated that an additional 14% of variance was 
explained by persistence time on incorrect trials of the metacognition task, Δ R2 = .14. Given 
these values, it can be interpreted that a significant portion of the variance in scores on novel 
trials was explained by the predictor variables, and that both predictor variables contribute 
significantly to the variance explained in the model. Values displayed in Table 2 correspond to 
the unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors of the mean, beta weights, R2 values, t 
values, and respective significance values. For the final regression model, the lower and upper 
limits of the 95% confidence interval for causal learning were .24 and 1.13, whereas upper and 
lower limits for metacognitive ability were -.22 and -.01. Because confidence intervals did not 
span zero, these results indicate that greater proportion of correct trials on the causal learning 
task is associated with a larger proportion of correct novel trials on the selective social learning 
task (β = .47, t (20) = 2.59, p = .02). Moreover, results suggest that a decrease in persistence time 
values on incorrect trials of the metacognition task is associated with a larger proportion of 
correct novel trials (β = -.38, t (20) = -2.10, p = .04).  
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Table 3. Performance on novel trials of SWL task regressed on correlates in the unreliable 
condition 
 
Predictors B SE b t p R2 Δ R
2 
Step 1       .27 
  Causal learning task .69 .26 .52 2.65 .01 
  




      
.14 
  Causal learning task .63 .24 .47 2.60 .01 
  
  Metacognition task -.10 .05 -.38 -.06 .04 
  
      
.41 
 
Note. n = 21. 
 
Model 2: Predicting performance on novel trials in the reliable condition. 
Performance on novel trials of the selective word-learning task was not significantly predicted by 
the predictor variables of interest at Step 1 and 2, Δ F (2, 17) = .43, p = .66. The unstandardized 
regression coefficients, standard errors of the mean, beta weights, R2 values, t values, and 
respective significance values are presented in Table 3. In other words, the predictor variables 














Table 4. Performance on novel trials of SWL task regressed on correlates in the reliable 
condition 
 
Predictors B SE b t p R2 Δ R
2 
Step 1       .02 
  Causal learning task .19 .25 .15 .64 .42 
  




      
.03 
 Causal learning task .17 .26 .13 .55 .51 
  
 Metacognition task -.08 .14 -.16 -.69 .50 
  
      
.05 
 
Note. n = 20. 
 
Regression models comprised of Causal Learning and PTs on first trials of Metacognition 
task. 
 In light of findings suggesting that persistence behavior decreases over repeated trials as 
a function of response-reinforcer contingencies (Nevin, 2009), additional prediction models were 
conducted. Specifically, the extent to which persistence time on the first incorrect trial of the 
metacognition task accounted for variance in performance on novel selective word-learning trials 
across experimental groups. Akin to the models described above, performance on the causal 
learning task was entered prior to persistence time on the first incorrect trial of the metacognition 
task. Results revealed comparable results, in that performance on novel trials of the selective 
word-learning task was predicted by both predictor variables of interest exclusively in the 
unreliable condition. It was indicated that in Step 1, causal learning accounted for 27% of the 
variance on novel trials, F (1, 19) = 6.60, p = .02, R2 = .27. In Step 2, when persistence time on 
the metacognition task was included, 42% of the variance was explained by both predictor 
variables of interest, F (2, 18) = 6.16, p = .01, R2 = .42.  
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Discussion 
The present study addressed two important questions in the field of early selective trust: 
(i) whether causal learning and precursors of metacognitive abilities—as measured through 
decision confidence—support selective social learning in 18-month-olds, and (ii) to what extent 
does each of these abilities predict such discriminant learning in infants. Although a large body 
of work has focused on preschoolers’ tendencies to display selective trust in reliable sources of 
information relative to unreliable sources, there is mounting empirical support for the emergence 
of such abilities in infancy (Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard 2016). However, there is a 
considerable amount of disagreement surrounding the psychological underpinnings at the origins 
of selective social learning. According to one account, infants draw on domain-general cognitive 
abilities (e.g., statistical learning and causal learning) (Heyes, 2016), whereas another account 
posits that young children use higher-order, domain-specific cognitive mechanisms (e.g., theory-
of-mind and metacognition) to resist learning from an unreliable speaker (Poulin-Dubois, 2016). 
To our knowledge, this is the first investigation of causal learning and precursor metacognitive 
abilities as potential mechanisms associated with selective social learning in infancy. This study 
presents preliminary evidence of predictive relations between both causal learning and 
metacognitive abilities with epistemic trust in infancy. Specifically, we find some support 
indicating that infants who displayed less decision confidence, and who had better causal 
learning skills, were also more willing to learn a novel word from an incompetent speaker on a 
word-learning task. 
 The classic selective word-learning paradigm was adapted to achieve our research 
objectives, wherein infants were exposed to an informant who offered accurate or inaccurate 
testimony—that is, an informant who correctly (reliable condition) or incorrectly (unreliable 
condition) labelled familiar objects. Infants’ willingness to learn a novel word was examined 
following this reliability induction phase. Consistent with previous work (Brooker & Poulin- 
Dubois, 2013; Crivello et al., 2017; Luchkina et al., 2018; Koenig et al., 2004) and with our 
predictions, infants in the unreliable condition were less likely to learn a new word, relative to 
infants in the reliable condition. As expected, infants performed above chance across trial type in 
the reliable condition. In contrast, infants in the unreliable condition performed above chance on 
familiar trials, but performance did not differ from chance on novel trials. In the unreliable 
condition, above chance-level performance on familiar trials suggest that infants accurately 
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offered the target object more often than would be expected to occur by chance alone, whereas 
chance-level performance on novel trials indicate that infants were likely performing at random. 
Taken together, these results indicate that infants were able to discriminate between sources of 
information, displaying selective trust in reliable sources relative to unreliable ones.  
These findings contribute to a growing body of work demonstrating that infants are 
sensitive to epistemic cues that guide their future learning (see Harris et al., 2018; Mills, 2013; 
Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016 for reviews). That is, infants may take into consideration 
what they know about the speaker’s knowledge when deciding from whom to learn. However, 
some researchers caution an interpretation that would suggest that this learning is rational, given 
that it may appear that children use epistemic cues to inform their learning but, in fact, may be 
unaware of the selectivity of their learning themselves (Heyes, 2016). Instead, it is proposed that 
this selectivity may be driven by simple causal learning processes (Heyes, 2016, 2017). 
  In an effort to address this debate—namely, whether general learning abilities are related 
to early selective social learning, and more sophisticated abilities come online later in 
development— two correlate tasks (i.e., causal learning and metacognition) were administered to 
examine the predictive power of different types to abilities on infants’ selective word-learning. 
According to Heyes (2016), domain-general mechanisms, such as causal learning, may be 
important for early selective word-learning, given that infants may use causal learning abilities to 
map words onto their intended referents. As such, causal information may facilitate the 
acquisition of new words from a reliable speaker, but thwart learning from an unreliable speaker 
because the association between a label and the respective familiar object is broken (Heyes, 
2016). A causal learning task was thus administered to obtain an index of 18-month-olds causal 
learning abilities. Akin to Sobel and Kirkham (2006), performance on three experimental trials 
was assessed relative to chance responding. In the present sample, 18- month-olds’ performance 
on all the three experimental trials was not different from chance. Performance on the “screening 
indirect screening-off” and “backward blocking” trials are consistent with response patterns 
reported by Sobel and Kirkham (2006). However, our results indicate that infants performed at 
chance level on the “screening-off” trials, whereas Sobel and Kirkham (2006) reported above 
chance performance. Moreover, contrary to what was reported by the original authors, results of 
the present study suggest an order effect, such that infants appear to perform progressively better 
across the fixed series of trials. This pattern of results may be indicative of learning across trials. 
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Considering that comprehension of the task was dependent on verbal ability (i.e., “Make it go”), 
perhaps these apparent differences across studies may reflect variability in infants’ 
comprehension of task instructions. Moreover, the task required goal-directed imitation that 
involves understanding of an agent’s intentions and to act on this knowledge by imitating the 
goals of the actor (Sakkalou, Ellis-Davies, Fowler, Hilbrink & Gattis, 2013). Thus, infants’ 
gradual improvement in performance may simply indicate better grasp of task demands, as well 
as improvements in interpreting an agent’s intentions and producing goal-directed behavior.  
Alternatively, other researchers suggest that selectivity in social learning is associated 
with individual differences in more sophisticated cognitive abilities (Poulin-Dubois, 2016; 
Sabbagh et al., 2017). Although less recognized in the selective social learning literature, 
metacognitive skills have been hypothesized to guide discriminate social learning, in that 
individuals reflect on their own knowledge states in order to adjust their social learning strategies 
(Heyes, 2016; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013). Whereas more explicit forms of metacognition emerge 
late in development, it has recently been shown that even infants are capable of using 
metacognitive judgments to guide their behavior (Goupil et al., 2016). That is, within the context 
of the present study, infants who were more confident in their own knowledge were 
hypothesized to learn less from an unreliable speaker. As such, a non-verbal form of 
metacognition was examined using a decision confidence monitoring paradigm, wherein infants 
were required to search for a toy in one of two boxes following a delay. Consistent with results 
reported by Goupil and colleagues (2016), infants searched the box longer after correctly 
identifying where the toy was hidden, as compared to trials where infants incorrectly identified 
the location of the toy. These findings suggest that more perseverance on correct trials indicate 
degrees of decision confidence, whereas less persistence on incorrect trials indicates a lack 
thereof. Results also revealed a positive relation among persistence time on correct and incorrect 
trials, suggesting that infants’ who persisted more on correct trials, also demonstrated increased 
persistence on incorrect trials. This result sheds light on the nascent nature of this behavior at this 
age, in that the metacognitive skills tapped by this specific task do not fully reflect infants’ 
internal monitoring of the accuracy of their own decisions. Moreover, the frequency with which 
infants looked inside the target box was analyzed as a subsequent measure of metacognitive 
ability. Indeed, infants more often looked inside the selected box on correct trials relative to 
incorrect trials, which may also represent an index of infants’ decision confidence. Together, the 
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present results provide additional empirical support for infants’ early metacognitive monitoring 
abilities. Given that metacognitive monitoring appear to be primitive in nature, future research 
should aim to examine these abilities in older samples of children. 
Overall, some support for our hypothesis was obtained, in that precursor metacognitive 
skills appear to be linked with 18-month-olds selective word-learning abilities exclusively in the 
unreliable condition. However, the pattern of results across trial type was unexpected. Infants 
who displayed less decision confidence on incorrect trials of the metacognition task appeared to 
be more willing to learn from an unreliable speaker on a selective word-learning task. 
Interestingly, causal learning skills also appear to play a significant role so that infants’ 
performance on both correlate tasks predicted performance on the word-learning task, but only in 
the unreliable condition, as anticipated. Moreover, infants who presented with better causal 
learning abilities were also more willing to accept an unreliable speaker’s testimony. Visual 
inspection of the regression paths suggests a possible interaction of the two abilities. However, 
the extent of infants’ willingness to learn from an unreliable speaker as a function of an 
interaction between causal learning and metacognitive abilities was not examined given the small 
sample sizes. Based on these findings, it appears that infants who were more inclined to learn 
from an unreliable speaker, also lacked confidence in their own knowledge in a confidence-
monitoring task. It may be that under such circumstances of uncertainty, they may rely on more 
causal learning abilities to better learn the association between a novel label and the respective 
object. This would be in line with a domain-general account of early word-learning (Booth, 
2009), and may reflect a variation of the copy when uncertain social learning rule (Rendell et al., 
2011). Future research should aim to assess this directly in order to provide more insight into 
how selective social learning manifests in infancy. 
 Moreover, the predictive power of causal learning abilities was observed to be greater 
than that of precursor metacognition. We propose that this may be a reflection of the immature 
development of these higher-order cognitive functions. As such, it is anticipated that explicit 
metacognitive judgments play an increasingly important role in early selective social learning as 
this ability becomes more mature—particularly when children begin to verbalize their mental 
states. Similarly, no association between persistence on correct trials of the metacognitive task 
and infants’ willingness to learn from an unreliable speaker was obtained. It appears that 
precursor metacognitive abilities only predicts infants’ social learning when they are uncertain of 
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their knowledge. We anticipate that confidence would govern successful selective learning as 
young children become better equipped to make more accurate estimates of what they do know. 
More specifically, as children acquire more experience in metacognitive monitoring and regulate 
their behavior accordingly, they would be better able to optimize their social learning from 
appropriate sources of information.   
Indeed, it has been proposed that knowledge confidence involves serial efforts of 
evaluating i) the source of knowledge (e.g., “How does this fit with my own knowledge”) and ii) 
developing justifications for knowing (e.g., “Do I judge this claim to be credible?”) (Hofer, 
2004). This, no doubt, represents a more sophisticated form of epistemological thinking that is 
likely not present in infancy. We, therefore, echo Heyes’ (2016) hypothesis specifying that as 
children develop a stronger capacity for metacognition, they will then be able to more readily 
adjust social learning strategies that reflect metacognitive judgments. Finally, in contrast with 
predictions from a domain-general perspective of early selective social learning, causal learning 
abilities appear to be associated with a more indiscriminate—rather than discriminate—form of 
learning. 
To date, extant research on this topic only includes two studies that investigated the link 
between domain-general and domain-specific mechanisms with selective social learning abilities 
in infancy (Crivello et al., 2017; Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2018). Both studies support a rich 
account for early selective social learning, such that infants’ abilities to develop inferences about 
others’ states of knowledge has been found to govern successful selective word-learning 
(Crivello et al., 2017), and successful detection of emotional reliability (Crivello & Poulin-
Dubois, 2018). More specifically, 18-month-olds were less likely to acquire a new word from an 
unreliable speaker if they displayed better understanding of an informant’s knowledge, but no 
such link with statistical learning abilities emerged (Crivello et al., 2017). Similarly, 14-month-
olds demonstrated increased persistence to inspect an empty container following an unreliable 
display of emotion (i.e., emoter displaying happiness when the container did not contain a toy). 
Moreover, in-group variability in latency to inspect the empty container was associated with 
superior performance on an adaptation of a knowledge inference task (Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 
2018). Again, no link was reported between successful emotional unreliability detection and an 
associative learning task (Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2018). 
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How can we reconcile previous research with the present findings? Several explanations 
can be offered to account for what appears to be a discrepancy. First, infants’ causal learning 
abilities were measured in an effort to investigate the predictive power of this ability on early 
selective word-learning. Contrary to what was previously reported (Crivello et al., 2017; Crivello 
& Poulin-Dubois, 2018), results suggest that particular domain-general mechanisms may 
facilitate word-learning in a selective trust paradigm. It should be noted that the mechanisms that 
drive infants’ abilities to represent and acquire causal knowledge is currently a topic of debate in 
developmental psychology. Specifically, whether associative theories can account for predictive 
behavior in infancy (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), or whether more sophisticated 
computational models of causality underlie infants’ ability to predict future behavior (Lagnado & 
Sloman, 2004; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003). As such, this debate 
challenges the view that causal learning abilities represent “simple” mechanisms in infancy. 
Moreover, unlike statistical and associative learning mechanisms, causal learning abilities 
necessitate complex inferential capabilities that are based on principles of causality, temporal 
priority, spatial priority, and contingency (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982). As such, the 
ability to develop causal inferences involving multiple potential causes and based on more 
complex probabilistic reasoning (i.e., principles of conditional independence; Sobel & Kirkham, 
2006), may represent a more sophisticated form of domain-general abilities compared to those 
examined in previous research.  
In addition, the causal learning task developed by Sobel and Kirkham (2006) may not 
reflect asocial learning—“i.e., direct interaction with the inanimate environment”— that 
characterizes many general learning mechanisms (e.g., associative learning; Heyes & Pearce, 
2015). As previously mentioned, the causal learning task required infants to draw inferences 
about an agent’s goal, and subsequently imitate goal-directed behavior. Thus, this task may rely 
on the ability to develop an understanding of an individual’s intention in order successfully 
imitate their behavior. This would not only support the idea that the domain-general mechanism 
measured here may reflect a more complex ability, but indicates that the task may be confounded 
by domain-specific, mental state attribution skills. 
Subsequently, we examined a domain-specific ability that was initially thought to only 
emerge during the preschool period (Flavell, 1999; Sodian et al., 2012). In particular, we 
investigated metacognition of one’s own ignorance, first demonstrated at 18-months of age 
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(Goupil et al., 2016), whereas previous efforts to examine the correlates of selective trust in 
infancy investigated theory-of-mind abilities—those that have been shown to emerge as early as 
7-months (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010). Although evidence of infant theory-of-mind rests 
on a similar debate surrounding its origins (see Heyes, 2014; Poulin-Dubois & Yott, 2017; Scott 
& Baillargeon, 2014; Ruffman, 2014), it appears that there may be more opportunity for the 
development of mental state attribution abilities (i.e., theory-of-mind knowledge) relative to an 
understanding of one’s own knowledge (metacognition) (but see Meltzoff, 1999 for a different 
view). A recent longitudinal research provides support for the primacy of theory-of-mind over 
metacognition (Ebert, 2015). Thus, theory-of-mind abilities may be better predictors of early 
selective trust as compared to metacognition, given that infants may show more understanding of 
others’ knowledge relative to their own. Moreover, the nature of the metacognitive task may also 
account for the current pattern of results. That is, the uncertainty monitoring paradigm may only 
reflect an implicit understanding of infants’ own mental states—an understanding that we share 
with non-human animals (see De Waal, 2016 for a review). Indeed, a more explicit 
understanding of one’s own knowledge and ignorance may better account for successful 
selective social learning (Heyes, 2016). However, a task that requires more effortful reflection of 
knowledge or ignorance, such as an information-seeking paradigm, may better elucidate the 
relation between metacognitive ability and early selective social learning.  
Finally, the limitations of this study should be acknowledged. First, the between-subjects 
design may limit our interpretations, in that it does not permit infants to select from who they 
prefer to learn. A within-subjects approach to early word-learning would allow for a better 
understanding of the mechanisms supporting infants’ decision to select from who to learn, and 
thus enable us to draw more powerful conclusions. It should be noted, however, that a within-
subjects design would incur executive function demands that would likely increase the difficulty 
of the task given that these abilities have been shown to improve significantly during the 
preschool period (see Diamond, 2013 for a review). Infants would be required to track the 
reliability of two informants simultaneously and draw on inhibitory control abilities to attend to 
the competent speaker while ignoring the incompetent one. Ongoing research in our laboratory is 
using a within-subjects adaptation of the word-learning task with 18-month-olds. Preliminary 
findings suggest that although infants prefer to learn from a reliable speaker, the effect is less 
robust than when tested with a between-subjects design. Additionally, the present study does not 
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include a control condition that would examine the specificity of the effect. It is possible that 
infants’ tendency to resist learning from an unreliable speaker is merely a reflection of their 
general cognitive abilities, and not as a result of stronger metacognitive and causal learning 
skills. As a consequence, the impact of infants’ productive vocabulary size on selective word-
learning abilities was analyzed as proxy for general intelligence. Results did not reveal any 
significant associations between productive vocabulary and novel word-learning in both the 
reliable and unreliable conditions.  
In conclusion, the present set of findings informs the heated debate between rich and lean 
approaches to early selective social learning. This is the first investigation to provide preliminary 
support that both implicit metacognitive abilities and causal learning skills may be related to 18-
month-olds stronger propensity to learn from an unreliable speaker. Findings may reflect a 
variation of the copy when uncertain social learning rule, in that infants may draw on causal 
learning to learn a new word—irrespective of the speaker’s competency—when unconfident in 
their own knowledge. Future research initiatives should examine the predictive power of more 
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Participant ID: ______ 
Word Checklist 
Please indicate which words your child understands from the following list. If you use a different word for 
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